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Abstract 
This Briefing Paper aims to break the sterile exchange of well established positions 
that has characterised EU–African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) debate on trade for 
the past five years or more. Negotiations have now begun for a successor to the trade 
regime in the current Cotonou Agreement. The new trade regime is scheduled to be in 
place by 2008. 
The first phase of negotiations covers general principles. There is disagreement 
between the ACP (which want this phase to last a year and result in a binding 
agreement on the areas covered) and the EU (which appears to want a shorter time 
period and no binding agreement). But in either case, serious, informed negotiation 
for phase 2 cannot occur unless certain basic research has been completed.  
The Briefing Paper describes the potential implications for agriculture of a new trade 
agreement. It assesses the data and analysis that is required to understand ACP 
interests. And it indicates which data and analyses are already available, which need 
to be undertaken, and the priority areas for this new work. 
The ACP–EU negotiations are taking place during a period when there are many 
other, parallel negotiations all of which will have inter-related effects. For both 
practical and developmental reasons, the ACP need to identify, first, their national 
development priorities and, second, their regional goals. These should be the 
foundations on which their multilateral policy is based. Trade policy with the EU 
needs to be tailored so that it is compatible with these national, regional and 
multilateral priorities. The tail of a trade agreement with one (albeit important) trade 
partner should not wag the dog of national, regional or multilateral policy. 
A high priority for new research is to identify the potential implications of reciprocity 
in the area of agriculture. An initial set of scoping studies can be based upon a 
simplifying assumption that the terms of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
will be similar to those of the EU–South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation 
Agreement EU–SAFTA). They can use various hypothetical EPA memberships to 
show the range of potential effects. 
This initial set of studies will allow each ACP state to identify the range of 
agricultural products that could be excluded from an EPA. In this way, they can 
identify more clearly than is possible at present the potential competitive and fiscal 
effects of reciprocity. To the extent that ACP states lower their restrictions on imports 
from the EU, domestic producers will face greater competition. And, unless 
alternative revenue sources are obtained, a lowering of tariffs will, at least in the 
medium term, result in a fall in government revenue. 
Agricultural producers stand to be affected by both impacts. They will face increased 
competition from cheaper food imports. And they may suffer from any knock-on 
effects of reduced government revenue on lower agricultural development 
expenditure. 
Such sensitivity analysis will not only guide ACP states on the potential effects of 
different EPA memberships. They will also help identify the ways in which 
development and regional integration strategies need to evolve to overcome the new 
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challenges. For these outcomes to arrive in good time for the phase 2 negotiations 
data gathering needs to commence by November 2002.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
1.1  Breaking out of the circle 
This Briefing Paper is intended to 
advance the discussion of a post-2007 
ACP–EU trade regime which is too 
often sterile. The formal negotiations 
have now begun, but much remains to 
be done before there can be an informed 
debate about specifics. Many of the 
general points that can be made have 
already been put numerous times, so the 
broad issues are well known. For 
detailed discussion to move forward it 
must be informed by more empirical 
evidence, some of which still needs to 
be collected. It is vital that this is done 
if the negotiations are to progress 
constructively.  
The Briefing Paper seeks to help the 
negotiating parties break out of an 
unhelpful reiteration of established 
positions (Box 1). It sets out the range 
of potential effects of a new trade 
agreement in the area of agriculture and 
identifies the critical data needed to 
allow countries to calculate the impact 
of change. Only once this has been done 
can they take an informed decision on 
whether or not to accept the proposed 
new regime. 
1.2  The broad issues 
1.2.1 Preference erosion 
The current negotiations are probably the most important ones for the ACP–EU trade 
relationship since Lomé I was hammered out in the early 1970s. This is because the 
world has moved a long way in the past three decades so that the current preferences 
have a limited shelf-life. Even if they were not due to expire in 2007, it is likely that 
they would lose much of their value to the ACP by the end of the decade or 
thereabouts (see Box 2).  
Preferences are being eroded by EU liberalisation, both multilateral and via improved 
preferences such as the ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) initiative. The decision in the 
Uruguay Round to phase out all quotas under the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) by 
the end of 2004 will remove the most important policy-induced stimulus to 
Box 1. Recent history 
 
The basic arguments over the pros and 
cons of EPAs are over five years old. They 
date back to the EU’s proposal at the 
outset of negotiations for a successor to 
Lomé IV that the trade regime be revised. 
The European Commission’s arguments for 
and against a change were set out in a 
Green Paper to which the ACP (and also 
civil society and research organisations) 
subsequently responded [EC 1997]. They 
included the points that a new regime 
should do more to foster the integration of 
ACP states into the world economy and 
should be more easily defensible in the 
WTO.  
It was not possible to agree such a new 
regime from the outset of the Cotonou 
Agreement. Instead Cotonou extends the 
Lomé trade regime, but with the proviso 
that negotiations must commence in 2002 
for a successor regime that will come into 
effect in 2007. It is the scope of this post-
2007 trade agreement that is the subject of 
the negotiations that began formally in 
September 2002. 
The initial negotiating positions are set in 
very broad terms. The Commission 
obtained its draft negotiating mandate from 
the EU member states in June 2002 [EU 
Council 2002]. The ACP agreed their 
Guidelines for the Negotiations of 
Economic Partnership Agreements in July 
[ACP 2002]. Neither document goes much 
beyond general principles. 
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investment and production in the clothing/textiles sector. Although a tariff preference 
will remain, this is likely to be reduced over time.  
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In the medium term, the reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is 
likely to lead to lower prices in Europe 
for the products covered by Cotonou 
and its Protocols. In due course, the 
negative effect of this change on the 
more competitive ACP exporters may 
be offset by greater opportunities to 
increase the volume of agricultural 
exports to Europe (and other markets). 
But there may be a gap in time between 
the fall in price and the opening of 
markets. Consequently, if nothing is 
done to revamp the ACP–EU trade 
regime it may be virtually worthless to 
the ACP in a decade or so. 
1.2.2 Reciprocity 
These are big issues, going to the heart 
of ACP trade and agriculture 
development strategies, yet most of the 
discussion so far has focused on a much 
narrower issue: the perceived costs to 
the ACP arising from reciprocity in the 
proposed new EPAs. This is an 
important issue – but not the only one 
that deserves attention. Yet it is easy to 
see how this preoccupation with just 
one issue has come about.  
Under Lomé and Cotonou the ACP 
were required merely to treat the EU no 
less favourably than any other 
industrialised trade partner. In complete 
contrast, the new EPAs will offer duty 
free access for ‘substantially all’ EU 
exports to the ACP. (For a definition of 
‘substantially all’, see Section 2.4.2 
below). In the jargon, the ACP are 
expected to offer ‘reciprocity’. 
There are two reasons why the reciprocity debate has taken centre stage, to the 
exclusion of the other vital issues. They are that: 
♦ the ACP liberalisation required for reciprocity is bound to have adjustment 
and fiscal costs for these states in the form of increased competition for 
domestic producers and lower trade taxes for governments; 
♦ there is not much else to debate since the EU has not felt able to put 
forward in any detail other specific innovations for an EPA. 
Box 2. Preference erosion 
 
‘Preferences’ are useful to the ACP only if 
they either provide their exporters with a 
competitive advantage over some or all of 
their competitors and/or result in ACP 
products receiving premium prices when 
sold in the EU. Erosion will occur if either 
benefit is reduced – by improving the 
relative treatment of competitors or by 
reducing the price received. 
Some preferences on CAP items provide 
both types of advantage to the ACP. 
Calculating the extent of erosion following 
an EU policy change can be very complex – 
see Box 6. Take the case of beef. The EU’s 
most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff on beef is 
very high: equivalent to an ad valorem tariff 
of over 100 percent [see OECD 2001: 
Annex Table 1.3]. The main ACP beef 
exporters can sell 44,379 tonnes at a 
greatly reduced tariff – known in the jargon 
as a tariff quota (TQ). The major beef 
exporters from the Americas and 
Australasia also have a TQ on which they 
pay tariffs that are preferential – but higher 
than those paid by the ACP. The price 
received by the ACP (and other imported) 
beef is set by the market – but this is 
manipulated by domestic EU subsidy and 
price support policies to keep it at levels 
higher than those on the world market (Box 
6). 
The ACP gain because they are protected 
from direct competition with exports from 
the Americas and Australasia (which are 
limited by these countries’ TQs) and 
because the EU price is manipulated to be 
higher than that on the world market. 
Preference erosion could occur potentially 
as a result of any change to: the EU’s MFN 
tariff, the size of or tariff paid on the 
Americas/ Australasian TQ, a ‘structural 
change’ (such as merging the ACP and 
Americas/Australasian TQ), or changes to 
EU domestic policies that tended to lower 
European prices. 
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The EU’s reticence is due to a combination of: 
♦ the political sensitivity of any further extension of EU preferences on 
market access for goods which, by definition, have the strongest domestic 
lobbies – which is why they have not already been liberalised for the ACP; 
♦ a lack of precedents (and probably political sensitivity) on possible 
preferences in areas other than merchandise trade access (such as services, 
anti-dumping, competition policy, investment, etc.). 
ACP concerns over the adjustment and fiscal costs of liberalisation are undoubtedly 
valid, but the severity of the problem cannot be established in advance of further 
information on the possible membership and scope of any EPA. Hence, discussions at 
present are in an endless loop: agreement on the precise EPA arrangements to be 
adopted depend upon the costs and benefits of the proposed new regime which cannot 
be determined without a clearer indication of what is to be agreed! The circle needs to 
be broken by some initial assessments of the main alternatives. 
In the same way, the potential benefits of EPAs need to be assessed in order to 
establish whether or not they would be of real value to the ACP. There are two areas 
of potential gain, one direct and the other indirect. 
♦ The potential direct benefit would be improved access to the EU market 
for ACP exports. This could arise in several different ways ranging from 
the ‘traditional’ measures such as lower tariffs and less onerous rules of 
origin to removal of impediments to services trade (such as visa 
requirements for movement of professional staff), and curbs on EU 
freedom to impose anti-dumping duties or unreasonably onerous sanitary 
or phytosanitary (SPS) standards; 
♦ The potential indirect benefit would be if the need to negotiate EPAs 
provided a stimulus to regional integration between ACP states. Closer 
regional integration among ACP states may well produce significant 
economic and other gains if it results in economies of scale as members 
trade more with each other. If the EPA process accelerates integration it 
will have helped to achieve these gains. 
The indirect gain is difficult to assess in advance and is, indeed, highly controversial. 
Critics warn that the EPA process is more likely to retard than to advance regional 
integration. This is because the requirement to liberalise towards the EU has made the 
process of regional integration more stressful. An extreme case is provided by the 
situation of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) which, as explained 
in Section 3.1.3 below, may not be able to join the same EPA as their Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) partners. Since only time will tell whether or not the 
indirect effect of EPAs is the gain of faster integration or the loss of fragmentation, 
the analysis at this stage must be limited to the potential direct benefits.  
1.3  The structure of the Briefing Paper 
Section 2 of the paper describes the principal areas of concern. It summarises salient 
features of the negotiating mandate given to the European Commission by the EU 
Council and the equivalent ACP negotiating guidelines. It also provides a synthesis of 
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the EU’s ‘non-paper’ in which it revealed European preferences on the membership of 
EPAs. 
The section then moves on to consider the global and regional environment within 
which the negotiations will take place. These parallel negotiations will have a major 
influence upon the practical impact of any EPA provisions. In brief, there is little 
point in the ACP struggling hard for ‘concessions’ in an EPA that will be devalued by 
the time they come into effect or to resist ‘demands’ from the EU that may be 
conceded anyway in other fora. 
Since it is outside the scope of this Briefing Paper to discuss, in detail, each regional 
agreement, the bulk of the analysis concerns potential change at the multilateral level. 
The most important area of negotiation for ACP agriculture is the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Agriculture (WTO AoA). This could have a range of 
direct and indirect effects on agricultural and rural development and food security in 
ACP states. Different ACP countries are likely to be affected in varying ways 
according to the relative size and nature of their agricultural sectors. The EPA 
provisions need to be sufficiently flexible to allow ACP states to benefit from any 
potential gains that arise from the AoA and to offset, or adjust to, any potential costs. 
The ACP have also indicated that they should use their presence in the WTO to 
champion changes to the rules on regional agreements. This has a direct bearing upon 
negotiations with the EU. This is because Europe has justified the need for EPAs 
partly on the grounds that any future trade agreement with the ACP must be justifiable 
under Article XXIV of the WTO, which covers free-trade areas and customs unions. 
Evidently, if the provisions of Article XXIV (or another part of the WTO text that has 
a bearing) change before 2007, this will have implications for the necessary 
requirements for EPAs.  
Section 3 identifies the data that ACP states need to obtain in order to undertake the 
most important initial analysis. Of critical importance is the collection of information 
on the current structure of imports from the EU and the applied customs duties that 
are levied, taking due account of indirect trade (via neighbours) and smuggling. 
Without this information it is not possible to move forward to identify the likely 
effects of conceding reciprocity.  
Particular attention needs to be given to regional groups that include one or more 
members with a pre-existing reciprocal agreement with the EU. These include, for 
example, SADC (of which South Africa is a member) and COMESA (with Egypt). It 
may be very difficult for countries with a pre-existing agreement, and any others that 
have a close trading relationship with them (such as Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland) to enter into EPAs with their regional partners. To do so might result in 
the undermining rather than the reinforcement of regional integration. Such serious 
adverse effects of EPAs need to be taken into account at the earliest possible stage.  
Section 4 provides a proposed action plan. This includes a phasing plan that is linked 
into the negotiating timetable of the ACP as established in their Guidelines. It is 
designed to inform the preparations for phase 2 of the negotiations by allowing the 
ACP to articulate a strategy for the EPAs and any supporting changes to development 
strategy in order to accommodate reciprocity. 
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Section 2: The Principal Areas of Concern 
There is much that is not yet known, and this determines the type of research that it is 
sensible to undertake at the present time. We do not know which ACP states will 
agree to negotiate EPAs, or in what regional formation, the terms of the EPAs, or 
what will happen in other fora (notably the WTO) during the period of negotiation 
and implementation of EPAs. It is entirely possible, therefore, that the apparent 
feasibility of different configurations will change over time. 
Section 2 of this Briefing Paper reviews what is currently known and also what is 
known to be likely to change. On the basis of this guidance Section 3 describes an 
initial set of work that is appropriate to the current state of knowledge and the issues 
at stake. 
2.1  The starting point 
The EU and the ACP have adopted broad initial positions. These set the parameters 
for the work that needs to be done. This sub-section reviews these broad parameters. 
The following sub-sections introduce the main multilateral and regional developments 
that will interact with the post-2007 negotiations.  
2.1.1 The Commission’s mandate 
The mandate adopted by the Council in June 2002 does little to open up the potential 
gains from EPAs. The scope for further improvements in the EU’s market access 
regime is limited by the commodity composition of ACP exports, as well as the 
political sensitivity both of further liberalisation on CAP products, and of significant 
improvements to the rules of origin for sensitive, labour-intensive manufactures.  
Of these, the agricultural products covered by the CAP are probably the most 
important. The EU has correctly pointed out for a long time that a very high 
proportion of the goods actually exported by ACP states to the EU already enter duty 
free. Given the supply constraints in many ACP states, the agricultural goods covered 
by the CAP represent the only substantial product area in which useful additional 
market access preferences could be given. The only other significant way in which 
ACP export diversification could be encouraged would be by deliberately reducing 
the processing requirements needed to fulfil the rules of origin. This would be 
effective only if more of the processing could be done in a non-ACP state (such as 
South Africa) and less in an ACP one.  
In other words, to be of use for ACP goods exports, the post-2007 regime must offer 
substantially improved access on CAP items and/or better rules of origin. The 
mandate is silent on both. It defers discussion of improvements for ACP access to the 
European market until later in the negotiations. The only mention made of improved 
rules of origin is that the EU will ‘assess any specific request for change… presented 
by the ACP…’. 
This is particularly worrying since earlier drafts of the mandate included more 
concrete initiatives. An early Commission proposal was to extend ‘Everything but 
Arms’ (EBA) access to all ACP states. This would have addressed adequately the 
objective of extending product coverage. The agreed version, therefore, represents a 
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step backwards. A non-binding declaration by Sweden, supported by the UK and 
Denmark, and attached to the mandate, argues in favour of full EBA access. But the 
fact that it is endorsed by only three of the 15 EU members shows that this outcome is 
by no means assured. 
In the absence of any indications of ‘gains’ it is unsurprising that most discussion has 
tended to focus on potential ‘costs’. The mandate has sharpened some of the concerns. 
For a start, the mandate recognises no alternative regime to an EPA and emphasises 
the centrality of reciprocity. It states that the ‘Objective’ of EPAs will be ‘establishing 
free-trade areas’. 
Moreover, the mandate contains a number of demands that should ring alarm bells in 
the ACP. These include the following: 
♦ It proposes that ‘charges having equivalent effect’ to tariffs should be 
abolished immediately on entry into force of EPAs (i.e. in 2008), and not 
at the end of a transition period. How many ACP states are even aware of 
the charges they currently impose (such as excise duties, that may apply 
with differential effect to imported items) that the EU might construe as 
‘charges having equivalent effect’? And what would be the consequences 
of their summary abolition? 
♦ It seeks ‘national treatment’ for the EU in relation to trade in goods rather 
than most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment (see Box 9 in Section 3.2.1). 
Again, the implications of this have not been identified by many, or indeed 
any, ACP states. 
♦ It proposes that all tariff reductions be made from the rates applied on 
entry into force, rather than those currently bound in the WTO. In other 
words, the starting point for negotiation of an EPA will be much lower 
than it will be in the WTO Doha negotiations. This presents both a policy 
and a practical problem. The latter is dealt with in Section 3. The policy 
problem is that liberalisation based on applied rather than bound rates 
makes the issue of safeguards much more important (since ACP states will 
have lost – from the outset – the leeway to protect themselves from 
subsidised imports or import surges by raising tariffs to the bound level). It 
may also raise expectations among the ACP’s other trade partners and 
result in more being asked of them in the WTO negotiations. 
♦ The mandate’s provisions on safeguards and anti-dumping appear to 
ignore the concerns expressed by ACP states in relation to import surges 
for products subsidised by the EU. The section on safeguards refers only to 
Cotonou Annex V, Article 8; this deals only with the rights of the EU to 
impose safeguard restrictions, not to the reciprocal rights of the ACP 
(obviously enough, given that Cotonou does not provide for reciprocity). It 
may be the Commission’s intention that identical rights will apply to the 
ACP – but since the EU subsidises exports whilst the ACP do not, the 
safeguard needs of the two groups are different. The Article on anti-
dumping appears to limit action to the rights that the ACP already possess 
under the WTO. 
♦ The mandate also makes a sweeping demand that ‘quantitative restrictions 
and measure have equivalent effect’ be abolished on entry into force of 
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EPAs. Without any qualification, this could be interpreted to cover tariff 
quotas as well as formal quotas. In other words, it would restrict 
significantly the scope for modulation of liberalisation through the 
application of tariff quotas to reduced tariff rates during the initial phase. It 
also implies that the ACP national export quotas under the Sugar and Beef 
Protocols would disappear. This could result in a very sharp fall in exports 
in 2008 from the higher cost ACP producers. 
2.1.2  The ACP guidelines 
The ACP’s formal guidelines for the negotiations make a number of important points 
of principal and practice. Of particular importance, given the argument in Section 2.2 
below, the guidelines stress the need of ACP states to build or develop their analytical 
and negotiating capacity not only at the national but also at the regional, inter-regional 
and international levels [ACP 2002: para. 11). This is in recognition of the inter-
relatedness of parallel negotiations in different fora. 
The guidelines propose a two-phase negotiating process. Phase I, which should last 
until September 2003, should be concerned with the objectives and principles of 
EPAs and issues of common interest to all ACP states. The period should also be used 
to allow the ACP to undertake necessary research and capacity building. For this 
reason, the research timetable proposed in Section 4 is explicitly linked to the ACP 
preferred negotiating timetable. 
Among the list of issues to be discussed under phase I are a number that have strong 
agricultural implications. These include sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), 
the treatment of commodity protocols, evaluation of the impact of CAP reform on 
food exports and fisheries [ACP 2002: para. 12a]. 
The guidelines also identify a number of specific ACP objectives in the negotiations 
on trade. These include: 
♦ export subsidies and domestic support for all agricultural products 
originating from ACP states; 
♦ preservation of existing preferential arrangements; 
♦ negotiation of an increase in quotas under the commodity protocols in 
order to accommodate new entrants; 
♦ the restoration of lost quotas under the Sugar Protocol; and 
♦ attention to the special needs of net food importing states, single 
commodity producers and non-trade concerns such as rural development 
[ACP 2002: para. 35a1]. 
2.1.3 The EU’s ‘non-paper’ 
In addition to these two formal documents that are the foundations for the initial 
negotiations, a range of informal papers have circulated in the last twelve months or 
so. One of these deserves attention because it provides one of the most extensive 
statements of the Commission’s views about the potential membership of EPAs (Box 
3). It is known as the ‘non-paper’ [EC 2001]. 
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Under the Cotonou Agreement it is the 
prerogative of the ACP to decide upon 
the membership of the groups that may 
engage with the EU to negotiate EPAs. 
However, it is politically unrealistic to 
expect that the EU will not have views 
on the matter that it will seek to further. 
These need to be borne in mind when 
assessing the relative merits of the 
alternative potential negotiating con-
figurations. 
The Commission’s underlying rationale 
is that EPAs should promote genuine 
economic integration. Accordingly, ‘a 
high degree of economic integration 
within the ACP is desirable…’. Whilst 
‘requiring deep integration between the 
ACP as a pre-requisite for negotiation 
would … not be practical … EPAs 
should aim, within reasonable 
timeframes, to build on these 
principles…’ [EC 2001: 6]. 
This establishes a preferred ‘order of priority’ that ranks existing regional 
organisations in terms of their inherent suitability as EPA partners. A basic condition 
is that the negotiations must take place in a single setting and lead to a single 
agreement. Additionally, the order of preference is as follows. 
♦ Customs unions ‘offer the best conditions’ [EC 2001: 9]. 
♦ FTAs should also be considered provided either that they have already 
been implemented or that legally binding interim agreements exist and are 
being effectively implemented. 
♦ Regional economic integration initiatives lacking legally binding interim 
agreements or effective implementation should not be considered unless 
all members agree to negotiate with the EU in a single setting with a 
harmonised position and the aim of a single agreed plan and schedule. 
The non-paper also reflects upon various issues that have cropped up such as the 
obligations of least-developed EPA members, overlapping group membership, non-
ACP group members, and the conditions for a bilateral EPA with a single ACP state. 
It is at pains to deny that least-developed members of an EPA are exempt from 
reciprocity. Whilst there is scope for ‘differentiation’ in their favour, this should take 
the form of a delayed start or a slower pace of tariff dismantling [EC 2001: 13]. 
In cases where some members of a larger FTA belong also to a smaller customs union 
it is up to the ACP to decide which of the two should negotiate the EPA. If two or 
more regional groupings have overlapping membership, the members should normally 
decide which one agreement they wish to use as the EPA negotiating umbrella. 
However, negotiations could occur with more than one group if each is willing to 
harmonise closely its negotiating position with the other(s) so that the negotiations 
Box 3. Why EPA membership is 
important 
 
The EU and ACP are agreed that a large 
part of the negotiations will be done at a 
regional level. But which regions? The ACP 
group includes only one regional 
organisation in which significant formal 
responsibilities for trade negotiations have 
been transferred from national to regional 
bodies. Instead it has a large number of , 
partly overlapping, regional agreements that 
are moving (sometimes slowly, and 
sometimes crab-wise) towards closer 
economic and/or political integration. 
As explained in Section 3.1.2, the practical 
implications for any given ACP state of 
conceding reciprocity in an EPA will be 
heavily influenced by which other countries 
are members. Also, it may be impractical for 
some existing trade groups to co-exist with 
EPAs if their memberships are not identical. 
As explained in Section 3.1.2, this may be a 
particular problem for the continued SADC 
membership of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia 
and Swaziland. 
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take place in one setting with all ACP states having the same access arrangements 
[EC 2001: 11]. 
According to the non-paper ‘there is no legal reason which prevents the negotiation of 
an EPA with a free-trade area which has non-ACP countries as members.’ [EC 2001: 
11]. The EPA will simply not apply to the non-ACP state. But this may lead to trade 
diversion. This is especially likely in cases where the EU already has a trade 
agreement with the non-ACP state (as would be the case, for example, with both 
Egypt in COMESA and South Africa in SADC). Consideration should be given, 
therefore, to bringing the non-ACP state into the EPA. It is argued in Section 3.1.3 
below that this may be difficult to achieve. 
The Commission’s view is that bilateral EPAs should not be allowed to weaken 
regional economic integration. The non-paper states that ACP countries which are 
members of a customs union or FTA through which they would be eligible to 
negotiate with the EU ‘should … not be eligible for such negotiations on an individual 
basis.’ [EC 2001: 12].  
2.2  The global and regional environment 
The previous sub-section has reviewed the opening positions of the EU and ACP 
negotiators for the post-2007 trade agreement, but their work will be influenced not 
only by the evolution of these positions but also by what happens outside the 
negotiating room. The impact of whatever they agree will be altered by what is 
decided in the meantime in Geneva, Washington, Gaborone, Addis Ababa and 
elsewhere. The preparations for the ACP–EU negotiations need to take account of 
such external effects.  
2.2.1 The relevance of an integrated strategy 
The EU is only one (albeit an important) trade partner of the ACP. A central feature 
of ACP strategy is that the ‘tail’ of the negotiations with the EU should not ‘wag the 
dog’ of global and regional ACP interests. This is well recognised in the ACP 
Guidelines [ACP 2002: para. 29]. There are two, linked elements to the EU–
global/regional relationship. 
The first element is that the value to the ACP of any EU offers and the cost to them of 
EU demands may be different after 2007 than they are at the present time. This is 
because policy changes agreed in other fora may have changed the base line. As 
explained in Box 2, the value to the ACP of preferential access to the EU market will 
be eroded if, in the meantime, Europe offers equivalent preferences to other states or a 
fortiori lowers its MFN tariffs. By the same token, the economic and fiscal impact of 
ACP reciprocity will be different if the states have agreed substantial MFN tariff cuts 
in the WTO than if they have not. There is little point struggling hard for 
‘concessions’ that will be devalued by the time they come into effect or to resist 
‘demands’ that may be conceded anyway in other fora. 
The second element is that the negotiations with the EU should not set the agenda for 
other fora unless the ACP have determined that this is in their interests. For example, 
the post-2007 negotiations will run in parallel with the Doha Round, which may cover 
many of the same topics. The ACP need to avoid foreclosing on their negotiating 
options in the WTO by premature agreement with the EU (for example, by agreeing 
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to negotiate from the current applied tariff rather than their MFN tariffs). On the other 
hand, if it is in their interests to do so, an early agreement with the EU might help 
force the hand of other, less sympathetic parties (such as the USA) in the WTO by 
presenting a fait accompli.  
2.2.2 The parallel timetables 
Between them, the ACP states are engaged in a very wide range of negotiations. Some 
of the most important on-going ones are set out in Figure 1. Trade integration within 
regional accords such as SADC, COMESA and also the Union Economique et 
Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), the Caribbean Common Market etc. are 
already under way. Hence, the commitments made in these fora should take 
precedence over the others and establish the basis for anything that the countries of 
the region agree to negotiate with the EU or at the WTO.  
Figure 1. The post-2007, WTO and regional timetables 
Year Post-Cotonou Doha Round SADC Trade 
Protocol 
COMESA 
Customs Union 
FTAA 
2002 Preparation 
2003 
2004 
Implementation 
2005 
Negotiation 
 
Negotiation 
2006  
2007 
Negotiation 
 
2008 
Implementation 
 
2009   
2010   
2015 
Implementation 
  
Implementation 
2020 
Implementation 
 
 
If the Doha timetable is met, the negotiations in Geneva will also be concluded before 
those in Brussels. And, if the Uruguay Round precedent is followed, the 
implementation period for Doha will also be shorter for industrialised states (such as 
the EU) than is the case in most of the EU’s free-trade agreements. The same may 
also be true for the ACP: their Doha implementation may be shorter than is agreed for 
the post-2007 trade regime with the EU. Hence, any new WTO MFN rules are quite 
likely to be in place well before key elements of any post-2007 agreement between 
the EU and the ACP.  
The starting point for the negotiations with the EU should therefore be based upon an 
appreciation of the possible outcomes of the Doha Round. And the outcome most 
directly relevant to agriculture is that of the re-negotiation of the WTO AoA. 
2.3  The WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
There exist many misconceptions about what was agreed in the AoA during the 
Uruguay Round and how this has impacted upon the agricultural sector of developing 
countries. The AoA began a process of reinforcing rules and liberalising trade in 
temperate agricultural goods. But this process still has a long way to go. Many of the 
hopes and fears expressed about the impact of the current AoA are misplaced – but 
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they may start to apply during the implementation of the successor regime currently 
being negotiated. 
2.3.1 Assessing the AoA 
Many developing countries have a comparative advantage in agriculture but have 
been hindered from exploiting this because of other countries’ protectionism. They 
are likely in aggregate, therefore, to 
benefit eventually from global 
liberalisation. But it does not follow that 
all states will benefit immediately from 
all WTO rules.  
There are at least three reasons why the 
effects of multilateral rule-making 
cannot just be assumed to be favourable 
(or unfavourable) but must be assessed 
in specific cases. These are that: 
♦ WTO rules are about more than 
just liberalisation; their full 
impact will be determined by 
their effects across the board; 
♦ the rules are the result of 
political compromise rather than 
the application of textbook 
analysis; hence, there is no 
reason to suppose that, even in 
the realm of trade protection, 
there will be linear progress 
towards liberalisation (Box 4); 
♦ the situation of any given 
country (or socio–economic 
group within the country) will 
be affected in the short-term by 
its net trade position and, in the 
longer term, by its capacity to 
adjust to the new environment 
(which will be influenced 
fundamentally by its relative 
resource endowments); as in all 
such cases, there will be both 
winners and losers. 
Consequently, there are three steps in the process of assessing the effects of existing 
rules and predicting those of potential future rules. The same methodology applies 
when assessing the impact of EPAs on ACP agriculture.  
• The first step is to identify the precise scope of any actual or proposed rules 
(which may often have complicated requirements and exemptions). 
Box 4. When is ‘liberalisation’ not 
liberalisation? 
 
The EU portrays its CAP reforms as an 
exercise in ‘liberalisation’. But they have 
little in common with the concept of 
liberalisation as understood by economists 
which underpins the many analyses that 
aim to estimate the global effects of 
agricultural liberalisation. Hence, there is 
no reason why implementation of the CAP 
reforms should have the effects predicted 
in the economists’ models. 
Liberalisation in the textbook sense means 
reducing the government rules, taxes and 
subsidies that stop high-cost domestic 
producers losing market share to lower-
cost imports. It implies that the global 
location of production will change over 
time, with lower-cost producers increasing 
output and higher-cost producers declining.
EU ‘liberalisation’, by contrast, aims to 
sustain European production but to 
reshuffle the subsidies and taxes to make 
them less costly to the European budget 
and more easily defensible in the WTO. 
The EU currently provides €43 billion per 
year of direct support funded at the Union 
level. In addition, there is indirect support 
(e.g. because imports are made artificially 
expensive by tariffs) and national-level 
assistance. The 2002 Commission 
proposals seek to recycle €25 billion of 
direct, Union-level income support. They 
will have very limited effects on the EU’s 
overall agricultural trade since they will 
neither decrease production nor increase 
market access. But, as explained in Box 6, 
they will erode ACP preferences. 
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• The second is to assess the pathways of impact: the ways in which such rules 
might affect agriculture.  
• The third, once the agreement is implemented, is to measure the extent of change 
given the circumstances of each state (and vulnerable group). 
2.3.2 The scope of change under the AoA 
During the period before the AoA, most – 
if not all – states took advantage of the 
absence of substantial multilateral 
disciplines to indulge in a bewildering 
array of interventions and rules that have 
tended to distort their domestic markets 
and, hence, the world market for 
agriculture. Those states best able to 
afford them have tended to introduce the 
most substantial distortions. In this 
context, ‘the countries best able to afford 
distortion’ have been those with a high 
national income and a low share of 
agriculture in GDP (i.e. rich taxpayers and 
consumers and relatively few farmers). In 
other words, it is the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries (with notable 
exceptions such as Australia and New 
Zealand) that have been most profligate. 
And, hence, it is the agricultural goods 
produced in these states (i.e. temperate 
products and their substitutes) for which 
markets are the most distorted.  
The principal objective of the AoA 
negotiations was to bring some discipline 
to these distorting policies which few 
developing countries are able to afford 
(Box 5). It has been well remarked, 
therefore, that the AoA aimed to resolve a 
problem that developing countries do not 
have! This has fundamentally affected the 
ways in which the current AoA has 
impacted on developing countries. So far 
they have been affected more by the 
consequences of other countries’ policy 
change than by any changes they have had 
to make themselves. 
Given the complexity of current subsidies 
and trade restrictions, a first step for the 
AoA was to identify the principal policy 
Box 5. What the AoA agreed 
 
The Uruguay Round agreed new rules in 
each of the three areas of basic 
architecture. The tariff was agreed as the 
main trade restriction that could 
legitimately be imposed at the importing 
country’s border. Most quotas were 
converted into tariffs at the start of the 
implementation process.1 Industrial states 
have reduced these tariffs by 36 percent 
over the six years 1995–2000. 
Developing countries must do so by 24 
percent over the ten years ending 2004. 
Least developed do not need to cut their 
tariffs at all (but, like the others, must 
already have replaced quotas with tariffs). 
Unlike tariffs, domestic subsidies affecting 
production levels come in many different 
forms, so the AoA established a method 
of linking the different varieties into a 
single measure: the controversial 
Aggregate Measurement of Support 
(AMS). Aggregate producer subsidies 
have been cut by 20 percent by 
industrialised countries over the six years 
1995–2000, and developing countries 
must do so by 13.3 percent over ten 
years. The least-developed states do not 
need to cut their (typically negligible) 
domestic subsidies at all. 
Developed countries have also reduced 
by 36 percent the value of their direct 
export subsidies and by 21 percent the 
quantity of subsidised exports over the six 
years 1995–2000. The cuts for 
developing countries are set at two-thirds 
of this level over ten years. No cuts need 
be made by least-developed states 
(which are anyway unlikely to have 
provided any significant direct subsidies). 
 
 
1.  The main exception is the so-called TQ, under 
which a lower tariff is applied to a fixed quantity of 
imports of a good for which the MFN tariff is so 
high as to largely suffocate trade. 
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areas within which rules were to be established. Three areas were identified and these 
now form the basic ‘architecture’ of the Agreement. Current and, it is assumed, future 
negotiations will take place under each of these three headings: tariffs and other 
‘border measures’, domestic subsidies and export subsidies. 
It is important to remember that export subsidies are merely the most visible trade 
distorting intervention, not the most serious. Their scale is usually dwarfed by tariffs 
(that force consumers to pay artificially high prices to domestic suppliers) and 
domestic subsidies (that allow farmers to produce more than would otherwise be 
financially viable). The reduction of export subsidies should not be conflated with 
‘liberalisation’ or the removal of distortions. It is just one (relatively small) part of 
these processes. 
2.3.3 The pathways of change 
The direct, immediate effects of the Uruguay Round AoA on agriculture in most 
developing countries are likely to have been very modest [Stevens et al. 2000]. 
Attempts to measure this impact in developing countries by looking at domestic prices 
or government activities have not indicated any significant effects that can reasonably 
be attributed largely to the AoA.  
Of greater importance is the potential for future rules to affect agriculture in ways that 
may begin seriously to dilute distortions. These may well interact with the provisions 
of EPAs, with the result that the actual impact may be different from what is 
expected. 
The key to assessing the agricultural implications of future change is to focus on the 
pathways along which any impact would be mediated. In what ways do current (and 
potential future) WTO rules affect ACP agriculture and agricultural trade and, for any 
given country or socio–economic group, which pathways appear to be the most 
relevant? How will global rule changes affect markets for their exports and imports? 
And what does this mean for future trade with the EU? 
WTO rules can affect agriculture in two ways: 
♦ directly by altering the price of food or other agricultural goods (and of the 
goods from which the vulnerable earn the income to buy food) as a result 
of changes to the policies of both exporting and importing states; 
♦ indirectly by making more or less feasible some of the policies that are 
considered desirable to promote agricultural development. 
The direct effects arise because the primary reason why the EU and other OECD 
states have distorted their agricultural markets is to maintain production at higher 
levels than would otherwise apply. Hence, if subsidies are removed (which has not 
happened yet) the expected effect would be to reduce output in the most subsidised 
states and raise world prices (at least until non-subsidising exporters are able to 
increase their output). This would have a differential impact on ACP countries 
according to whether they are net exporters or importers, and on socio–economic 
groups depending on whether they are net consumers or producers. Opportunities 
would be created for ACP exporters (and net producers), but there would also be 
adjustment problems for importers (and net consumers).  
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Since these direct effects on prices will result from the actions of the EU and the other 
major subsidising states, the ACP can only avoid the potential effects on prices by 
engaging in negotiation. During the WTO negotiations they can seek to influence the 
form of OECD subsidy cuts in order to moderate the effects, and they can seek the 
same things during the negotiations with the EU for a post-2007 trade agreement. 
At the same time they need to plan offsetting domestic changes. These are likely to 
involve both changes to trade policy and direct or indirect expenditure on agriculture. 
Both are relevant to the Cotonou negotiations. 
Such responses require as a first step a clear understanding of the agricultural 
products with the greatest implications for ACP states and sub-regions. These are the 
goods which combine the characteristics that they are important for the economy as a 
whole and/or for vulnerable groups within an ACP state and they are heavily 
subsidised in the OECD in ways that are a target for rule change during the current 
negotiations. For example, sub-Saharan Africa is a substantial net importer of wheat: 
in 2000 its imports were valued at just over US$ 1 billion. Wheat is one of the 
products most likely to be affected if OECD states liberalise. The result could be both 
an increase in the price of imported cereals to SSA and, more seriously, a sharp fall in 
food aid (as global production shifts to countries with no need to dispose of ‘surplus 
production’). 
The indirect effects of the AoA arise because WTO rules may impact upon a broad 
range of government policies that affect agriculture. These include policies that 
support: 
♦ agricultural food production (e.g. input credit and subsidies, capital 
expenditure and investment promotion); 
♦ agricultural marketing (e.g. market development, parastatal reform and 
food price stabilisation); 
♦ agricultural employment creation (e.g. promotion of high-value export 
crops and small and medium enterprises); 
♦ transfers and safety nets in rural areas (e.g. labour-intensive public works 
programmes and targeted feeding programmes). 
If the new AoA includes more stringent rules that would constrain a government from 
expanding such programmes it might impact upon agricultural development. Such a 
constraint could arise either because the expenditure is considered an unacceptable 
subsidy or because the required revenue is unavailable as a result of trade tax 
reduction. Again, there will be differential impacts upon countries (relating to their 
capacity to fund such action, current levels of support and coverage by special and 
differential treatment (SDT) or other exemptions) and socio–economic groups 
(according to the extent to which they benefit from – or pay for – such interventions). 
A complicating factor of particular relevance to the ACP arises from the co-existence 
(especially in the EU and to a lesser extent the USA) of heavy agricultural 
protectionism with substantial trade preferences for favoured suppliers. Because 
preference beneficiaries receive prices related to those in the high-cost, protected EU 
market, rather than the world price, they will see their export prices drop as a result of 
liberalisation (Box 6). 
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This will cause particular problems to states that have limited scope to increase the 
volume of output (to offset falling unit values) either because there remain major EU 
access barriers or because they are high-cost exporters. The beneficiaries of the Beef 
Protocol could find themselves in the first of these positions. If CAP and WTO 
reforms result in a drop in EU beef prices but the EU’s MFN tariffs remain close to 
their current very high levels and there is no increase in preferential quotas, they 
would have no effective means of selling more even if output could be increased. 
Most of the Caribbean beneficiaries of the Sugar Protocol face both problems: the 
Sugar Protocol global quota is fixed, the EU’s MFN tariffs are stringent and their cost 
of production is higher than in some of the least-developed countries that will have 
unlimited duty free access to the EU after 2009 under the Everything But Arms 
(EBA) initiative.  
These changes could alter the relative competitiveness of domestic staples vis-à-vis 
some export crops. If so, it would alter the balance of an ACP state’s interests in the 
new trade regime. This potential needs to be taken into account in their negotiating 
strategy.  
These ‘costs’ for preference beneficiaries will not necessarily be offset in the shorter 
term by gains for exporters that are not so favoured. The current regime effectively 
transfers a small part of the economic rent created by the EU distortions to elements 
Box 6. Calculating preference erosion
 
Because of the complex ways in which Cotonou assists ACP exporters (see Box 2), it is 
often hard to calculate the extent to which an EU policy change will result in erosion – 
even though the broad direction of change is clear enough. Take the examples of the EU’s 
Agenda 2000 reforms and mid-2002 proposals on the preference for beef and rice [EC 
2002]. Both aim to alter the mix of policies that support domestic producers, not to reduce 
significantly the overall subsidy they receive. Market prices are set to fall, but European 
farmers will receive direct income support to offset this. 
If European market prices fall, so will those received by ACP exporters. If ACP exports are 
unrestricted, it may be possible for some states to offset a part of this by increasing the 
volume of exports. But where exports are limited by a TQ (as they are for beef and rice), 
they will have no opportunity to offset the decline in their return per tonne exported by 
increasing the volume of sales. 
It is important for ACP exporters to know how far EU prices will fall – but that is not clear. 
The EU proposals refer only to the ‘intervention price’ – the price at which the state steps 
in directly or indirectly to buy up produce that cannot find a buyer. Agenda 2000 cut the 
intervention price for beef, but also introduced subsidies for storage aimed to encourage 
the private sector to sustain market prices. It also retains export subsidies, so supporting 
the domestic market price by offloading some supplies on to the world market. The 2002 
proposal recommends for rice the same combination of a sharp (50 percent) cut in the 
intervention price, private storage subsidies to encourage the maintenance of prices above 
this level, and a ‘safety net’ price below this at which the state will intervene. 
Actual market prices will depend upon how farmers and traders react to these changes – 
and also on the Euro equivalent of world market prices (which, in turn, depends both on 
underlying prices and on the exchange rate). Hence, whilst it is easy to see that a 50 
percent price cut is proposed, it does not follow that actual market prices will fall by exactly 
this proportion. 
But the trend is clear. The EU’s aim is to reduce European market prices to close to world 
market levels. This is so that it will not have to pay WTO-vulnerable export subsidies to get 
rid of surpluses on the world market. It would remove one of the two benefits of ACP 
preferences (see Box 2). 
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in the value chain originating in the preference beneficiaries. If the rent is lost to the 
preference recipients it could just as easily be acquired by domestic EU producers as 
by non-preferred, developing country exporters. Only when EU and other OECD 
tariffs and domestic subsidies fall to non-constraining levels (which will probably not 
be until after a future negotiating round) will non-preferred exporters be able to assert 
their comparative advantage. 
This is important for food importing ACP states. The conventional wisdom is that if 
and when significant liberalisation occurs (and it has not yet done so – nor is it 
foreseen in current EU CAP reform, see Box 4) the impact of OECD production cuts 
on world prices would be mitigated by increases in output from those states that are 
not able to afford such heavy subsidies e.g. the members of the Cairns Group. 
Consequently, total world output would not fall by too much and prices will not rise 
very substantially. But, if this increased output does not occur during the period in 
which OECD subsidies and trade barriers remain significant, there could be a larger 
than expected surge in world prices. 
2.3.4 How much change next time? 
How likely is it that the current Round will produce such results? Although 
‘negotiations’ have been under way to review the AoA for one-and-a-half years, they 
have not made sufficient progress to allow any reasonable guess to be made of the 
precise changes that will be agreed. But some general points are emerging. 
It is clear that there will be negotiations in three main areas: tariffs, domestic 
subsidies and export subsidies. And there does appear to be a widespread view that it 
may be easier to agree significant cuts for export subsidies than in the other areas.  
This would tend to result in a direct, adverse effect on the prices paid by poor, food 
importing ACP countries. And, unless market access and domestic subsidy barriers in 
major markets were also reduced to non-constraining levels (which seems less likely), 
this might not be offset by increased production in competitive non-subsidising states.  
On a more positive note, slow progress on reducing OECD import barriers would 
leave open the potential of worthwhile preferences for ACP exporters. There is no 
guarantee either that the EU will agree to these in an EPA or that it will tailor its 
compliance with the new AoA rules in such a way as to protect preferences. But, at 
least, there appears to be a prima facie case that the ACP should push hard on the 
maintenance and extension of preferences for CAP products in the expectation that 
these will not have been made redundant by the current AoA negotiations. 
2.4  The WTO rules on FTAs 
The EU has expressed strongly the view that EPAs are required partly in order to 
justify within the WTO the continuation of preferences for ACP exporters. To achieve 
this they must be framed in such a way as to fulfil the requirements of WTO Article 
XXIV. This is the WTO provision that allows members to discriminate in favour of 
each other (and, hence, against others) provided that they are creating a customs union 
or free-trade area. Because they would involve reciprocal tariff cuts, the EU claims 
that EPAs would pass the Article XXIV test. 
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2.4.1 Formal rules and actual practice 
But what, exactly, are the requirements of Article XXIV? The formal requirements for 
an agreement to be treated as an FTA are fairly straightforward, but practice is not so 
clear cut. This is because Article XXIV is vague — by design rather than by accident, 
because members have been unwilling to restrict themselves through a more precise 
formulation. One salient requirement of Article XXIV is that the FTA must be 
completed ‘within a reasonable length of time’ (defined in the WTO as a period that 
‘should exceed ten years only in exceptional cases’). Another is that ‘duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce ... are eliminated on substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories’ [GATT 1947: Part 3, Article XXIV, paras 5(c) and 
8(b); WTO 1995: 32].  
There is a similar difference between the formal requirement for legitimising any 
proposed regime (clear cut) and practice (murky). The formal hurdle for approving an 
agreement as being in conformity with Article XXIV is high. The agreement must 
have the universal support of members because of the WTO practice of requiring a 
consensus for all decisions. But in the past a failure to achieve a consensus has not 
proved to be a barrier to those countries wishing to create an FTA. 
The first step is for the parties to the agreement to notify the WTO following 
signature of an FTA. Such notification will be followed by the referral of the FTA to 
the WTO Committee on Regional Agreements (CRA) for consideration. Membership 
of the CRA is open to any country that feels it to be in its interests to belong. In theory 
the CRA will produce a report on the compliance, or otherwise, of the FTA with 
Article XXIV for adoption by consensus of the WTO membership.  
But practice, at least during the pre-WTO period of the GATT, was a lot less clear 
cut. The majority of the cases notified to the GATT were interim agreements and 
some of their provisions came into effect before the relevant working group had 
completed its deliberations. As of January 1995, a total of 98 agreements had been 
notified under Article XXIV, but only six (of which only two were still operative) had 
been explicitly acknowledged as being in conformity with Article XXIV. 
There is no reason to expect a change in practice anytime soon. The CRA has a large, 
and growing, backlog of agreements to consider. It has not yet established any 
guidance for the interpretation of the regulations under the WTO. In fact, on past 
form, it is unlikely to give a straightforward approval or disapproval of any 
agreement.  
But this does not mean that countries can sign up to anything and just call it an FTA. 
In the absence of clear guidance from the Committee, it would still be open to any 
aggrieved WTO member to file a complaint under the dispute settlement mechanism. 
This could pass to a quasi-judicial body the task of defining such terms as 
‘substantially all’ trade. In other words, approval or disapproval of an EPA is likely to 
happen by default. Unless a WTO member challenges it on the grounds that it does 
not comply with Article XXIV, WTO compatibility will never be tested. 
2.4.2 Implications for EPAs 
In case a challenge is made, it is important that the requirements of Article XXIV be 
taken seriously in structuring any EPAs. But, of course, these requirements could 
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change. One arena for negotiating change is the Doha Round. The ACP Guidelines 
state that the ACP should champion such change by preparing and submitting 
concrete proposals [ACP 2002: para. 16].  
At present it is difficult to be sure what all this means for the structure of EPAs but 
some guidance is available from the EU–South Africa Agreement on Trade, 
Development and Co-operation (EU–SAFTA). This not only makes clear what the EU 
interprets Article XXIV to require, but it is also possible that, between now and 2007, 
it could be subject to a WTO challenge and so provide a test case for the interpretation 
of Article XXIV. 
The EU has stated that it believes that the Article XXIV requirement that an FTA 
must cover ‘substantially all’ trade can be fulfilled if both parties reduce to zero tariffs 
on products that account for 90 percent on average of the current trade between them. 
It has also indicated that it believes this average figure can be achieved 
asymmetrically, with the EU liberalising on more than 90 percent and its partner on 
less. In the specific case of the EU–SAFTA, South Africa has liberalised on products 
accounting for 86 percent of its imports from the EU while Europe has liberalised on 
94 percent. The agreement also indicates that the EU believes the Article XXIV 
requirement that liberalisation occur ‘within a reasonable period of time’ can be 
achieved through a transitional period of up to 12 years. 
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Section 3: The Data Requirements and Availability 
3.1  Establishing Priorities 
Section 2 has outlined the cross-cutting issues that the ACP have to consider in their 
various parallel negotiations. It is clear that there are many areas in which ACP states 
potentially need to generate new data and analysis. Even if the resources were 
available for all of the wide-ranging analysis that is desirable, it would probably be 
beyond the ACP’s absorptive capacity to undertake it all within a very short period of 
time. It is vital, therefore, that a priority for the work be established. This needs to 
take account both of the types of data that need to be collected and analysed and of 
the competing demands placed on the ACP states by the large number of concurrent 
agreements under review. 
3.1.1 ACP needs 
The first step is to identify the issues that are of the greatest importance to the ACP as 
a whole and to sub-regions. Within this group, the first priority needs to be given to 
those that apply to more than one set of negotiations. This is both because of the 
higher pay-back achieved on multi-agreement issues and also to ensure consistency 
between the positions taken in different fora. 
This suggests that the analysis of ACP agricultural strategy should be undertaken 
according to the following hierarchy. Domestic agricultural development priorities 
should be the first concern; the role of each country’s trade strategy is to give effect to 
these aims. Existing, and potential future, commitments towards regional agricultural 
integration are next in line. Bearing in mind national and regional priorities, the next 
significant forum (in terms both of chronology and of economic importance) is the 
WTO.  
The scope for any post-2007 accord with the EU must be determined, therefore, by 
the space that is left by national, regional and multilateral commitments. It would be 
quite wrong for a plurilateral agreement such as the EU is proposing to determine in 
any way the shape of either regional or multilateral accords. Rather, it should build on 
such agreements, providing an extra international dimension to what has been agreed 
regionally and going beyond the rules that have been made multilaterally. 
3.1.2 Assessing the potential effects of reciprocity 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this Briefing Paper to assess all the agricultural data 
needs required by each ACP state, to determine the place of an EU accord within their 
broader agricultural strategy, a number of common themes apply to many members of 
the group. A key element, that will inform all the others, is to gauge the practical 
implications of reciprocity for domestic agricultural competition and government 
expenditure on agriculture. 
Among the items of information required to make such an assessment of the effects of 
reciprocity on agricultural production and support are: 
♦ the proportion of trade to be covered by the reciprocity commitment; 
♦ the implementation period for reciprocity;  
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♦ the membership of an EPA; and 
♦ the incremental costs and benefits of an EPA over and above those 
deriving from parallel negotiations. 
In brief, whilst it is not yet possible to provide 
a definitive assessment of ‘benefits’ or ‘costs’ 
of EPAs (let alone an economic analysis of 
their effect on the ACP economies), there is a 
clear and urgent need for a set of ‘what if’ 
analyses. These would identify the potential 
product exemptions from EPAs of different 
memberships (see Box 7).  
Such an initial, illustrative round of analysis 
would allow the ACP to identify the potential 
scale of adjustment costs according to varying 
assumptions about the provisions and 
membership of any particular EPA.1 This 
could form the basis both for finalising the 
membership of each EPA and for undertaking 
follow-up studies in areas identified as 
potentially important. 
The reason why it is necessary to make some 
assumptions about EPA membership is that 
the 86 percent rule would, probably, apply to 
the total imports of the region, not the imports 
of each state. Hence, the range of sensitive 
products that could be excluded from 
liberalisation would be determined both by the 
current commodity pattern of regional trade 
with the EU and by intra-regional negotiations 
(since each EPA member would, presumably, 
attempt to exclude from liberalisation its own 
most sensitive products rather than those of its 
neighbours). 
3.1.3 Implications for overlapping agreements 
This research is important for all ACP countries but it is especially vital for those in 
regions that include states with their own pre-existing trade agreement with the EU. 
This applies, for example, to SADC (with South Africa being party to its bilateral 
trade agreement), to COMESA (with the Egypt – EU trade agreement) and to the 
Caribbean states (which are negotiating the FTAA that includes several different EU 
                                                                    
1  The figures would tend to overstate the adjustment costs of EPA reciprocity because they will not 
take account of indirect and smuggled trade. In cases where one member of a regional trade group 
already imposes low tariffs on EU goods, its partners will find that the regional liberalisation already 
agreed will result in de facto liberalisation towards the EU. The additional adjustment costs of the 
EPA will be lowered to the extent that EU goods are already entering ‘by the back door’. This 
reasoning applies a fortiori to smuggled goods – tariff-free imports from the EU may simply replace 
goods that currently enter duty-free because they are smuggled. 
Box 7. Assessing the ‘cost’ of 
reciprocity 
 
An illustrative example of initial ‘what 
if’ studies can be provided by using 
the terms of the EU–SAFTA as a 
model. This allows us to establish 
the range of products that could be 
excluded from liberalisation by ACP 
states in different regional 
configurations. If, for example, one 
were to hypothesise an EPA 
between the EU and SADC, it would 
be necessary to:  
♦ identify the current commodity 
composition of SADC member 
states’ imports from the EU; 
♦ rank these according to 
sensitivity either in relation to 
domestic competition or 
government revenue; and 
♦ determine how many 
competitive/revenue-important 
products could be excluded from 
liberalisation without breaching 
the requirement that 86 percent 
of imports be included. Within 
this group of potentially excluded 
products there could be a 
number of agricultural goods. 
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agreements: the Mexico FTA, the Andean and Central America special GSP regimes, 
plus the USA and Canada MFN regimes). The problem in all of these cases is to 
marry the terms of the pre-existing agreements with those of an EPA without 
disrupting regional trade and integration.  
The case of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) is an extreme 
example of the difficulties that may be experienced linking EPAs to existing 
agreements. There are important respects in which it will simply not be possible for 
an EPA including a BLNS state to be 
significantly more favourable to ACP 
members than is the EU–SAFTA. To see how 
this situation has come about, consider the 
practical task of identifying which products 
are to be excluded from liberalisation under 
the 86-percent-of-current-trade rule and the 
timetable for tariff removal on those items that 
are not excluded. 
In principle, EPA members will be able to 
exclude from liberalisation any products that 
are especially sensitive and do not account, in 
total, for more than 14 percent of their imports 
from the EU. But in the case of BLNS, a 
whole range of products has already been 
excluded from liberalisation towards the EU 
under the terms of the EU–SAFTA. In both 
legal and practical terms, it would not be 
possible for BLNS states to liberalise imports 
from the EU of a product which South Africa 
is not liberalising (see Box 8).  
The legal impediment is the existence of a 
customs union and its common external tariff. 
The practical problem is that South Africa 
could not be expected to stand idly by and see 
the exclusion of a product of the EU–SAFTA 
by-passed as a result of imports coming in via 
a BLNS state. By the same token, an EPA 
including BLNS could not exclude from liberalisation any product for which South 
Africa has agreed to liberalise. If the EPA attempted to avoid immediate, complete 
liberalisation of these items, its import restrictions would be overridden for BLNS by 
imports entering via South Africa. The same would apply to any other EPA members 
that failed to impose rigorous origin rules, administered via heavily controlled borders 
on intra-regional trade. 
3.1.4 Offensive interests 
As indicated in Section 1.2, although ACP interests have been heavily focussed on the 
implications of reciprocity, the negotiations need to address several other very 
important issues. These all centre on the fact that the existing trade regime is eroding 
fast and needs to be revived. 
Box 8. The South African problem 
 
The pre-existing exemptions in the 
EU–SAFTA will reduce the scope of 
BLNS states (and any others that 
enter into an EPA with them) to 
exclude products that are particularly 
sensitive for them. For example, 
South Africa has excluded wheat 
flour from the list of products it will 
liberalise (at least until further 
notice). This product will also need to 
be excluded from liberalisation in any 
EPA that includes BLNS. Since 
wheat flour accounts for 2 percent of 
SADC imports from the EU, this 
exclusion will reduce the scope for 
further exclusions to just 12 percent 
of total imports. Yet wheat flour may 
not be an item that it makes sense 
for SADC to exclude (because it 
does not produce competitive 
products). 
On the other hand, South Africa has 
agreed to liberalise fully by 2005 
imports of boneless poultry, jams 
and prepared fruit. In other words, 
imports will be completely 
unrestricted before an EPA comes 
into force. 
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Since the EU’s mandate contains no specific proposals for improving its import 
regime, and merely offers to respond to ACP requests in certain areas, it is important 
that the ACP take the initiative to articulate their demands. This will require research. 
The ACP Guidelines specifically refer to the need to assess the impact of CAP 
reform. In addition, the ACP’s demands for treatment of its agricultural exports under 
EPAs need to take account of (and seek to influence) the EU’s positions in the WTO. 
It seems very unlikely that the current negotiations on the AoA will result in a 
substantially more liberal EU import regime for products covered by the CAP. Hence, 
the possibility will continue to exist for significant ACP preferences. The task for the 
negotiations will be to ensure that this potential is realised. 
Given that the EU has proposed in its mandate to remove all quantitative restrictions, 
a high priority for initial research is on those products currently subject to tariff 
quotas. These include sugar, beef and rice. An early study should be to identify the 
implications for ACP exporters of the removal of any quantitative restrictions on their 
exports to the EU in order to help articulate a negotiating position that serves all ACP 
interests. 
3.2  The first round of research 
3.2.1 Sensitivity analysis on ‘defensive’ issues 
As is clear from Section 3.1.3, the very fact of negotiating an EPA with the BLNS 
countries would impose barriers to trade within a Southern African regional group. 
This is one of the most obvious ways in which an EPA could undermine rather than 
reinforce regional integration. To avoid this undesirable outcome the implications of 
such overlapping memberships need to be assessed as soon as possible. 
It can be seen from this example that sensitivity analysis of different EPA 
memberships and product coverage would be enormously helpful since it would 
establish in broad terms the scale of adjustment likely to be required through 
reciprocity. At present, ACP states are aware only that they will face increased import 
competition and government revenue loss, but without any coherent idea of the scale 
of these effects. Research can throw light on both the effects on the goods that are 
included in reciprocal liberalisation and on those that are excluded. 
It might be thought that there would be no effects of increased import competition on 
the excluded goods. But there could be two types of impact. One is through indirect 
effects: if, for example, imports of a substitute were liberalised, consumption of the 
excluded good might fall as the price difference between the two items shifted 
consumption patterns in favour of imports. Another is if excluded products receive 
additional protection from excise duties, licensing or other measures with a tariff-like 
effect. As noted in Section 2, the EU wants these abolished at the start of the 
negotiations. Even if it fails in this demand, the ACP must expect it to push hard for 
the elimination of ‘charges having equivalent effect’ to tariffs, even on goods that will 
be excluded from formal liberalisation.  
A related piece of preparatory research that could ease the negotiations substantially 
would cover mechanisms to collect value-added tax (VAT). It is well understood that 
a fall in tariffs will necessarily shift the source of government revenue from trade 
taxes to a sales tax or VAT. The latter are economically superior but administratively 
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more difficult to collect. Hence government revenue is expected to fall, since a 
smaller share of the tax collectable will actually be collected under a VAT system. 
This administrative problem could be reduced by using a country’s customs 
department to collect VAT on imports (as is common practice). If the VAT system 
were to operate well, this initial payment would be rebated against the payments made 
by the users of imports. If the VAT system worked poorly, the government would at 
least continue to have revenue related to import value taxed ‘at source’. 
The analysis of competitive and fiscal effects needs to take account not only of tariff 
cuts but also of the EU’s initial position that ‘charges having equivalent effect’ be 
abolished and also that the ACP offer the EU ‘national treatment’. What is required in 
these cases is baseline research that will establish for each ACP state the extent to 
which these are relevant issues.  
The definition of ‘charges having equivalent effect’ is open to debate. Clearly, if a 
country imposes an excise duty on imported spirits at a higher level than on 
domestically produced ones there is a prima facie case that the difference is a ‘charge 
having equivalent effect’. But what about the situation in a country that does not 
produce spirits domestically (although it does produce other alcoholic beverages) yet 
imposes a high excise duty on spirits? 
As these examples make clear, there is a lot of preparatory work to be done. Each 
ACP state needs to know which of its current taxes might be construed as a ‘charge 
having equivalent effect’, on which of these it can mount a strong defence, and what 
the effect would be on government revenue of changing its current policy. Until this 
information is available, the implications of the EU’s demand cannot be assessed. 
A similar requirement for baseline 
research is needed in respect to ‘national 
treatment’ (Box 9). In many cases, the 
requirement for ‘national treatment’ may 
be no different from that needed to comply 
with liberalisation. If import duties are set 
at zero and there are no other govern-
mental regulations that apply specifically 
to imports, then EU suppliers of a good are 
being treated exactly the same as domestic 
suppliers. But there may be other 
circumstances in which current legislation 
treats EU suppliers differently from 
domestic suppliers. 
Two parallel sets of research are required. 
One is to identify within ACP countries 
areas where there is a perception that 
domestic suppliers are treated differently. 
The other is to seek clarification from the 
EU of instances in which it believes 
‘national treatment’ would result in a 
change to the status quo additional to the 
removal of tariff barriers. 
Box 9. What is national treatment? 
 
A basic principle of the WTO is MFN 
treatment in goods trade: a member 
should not discriminate between trade 
partners, but it can treat domestic 
producers more favourably than foreign 
producers. The concept of national 
treatment goes further – it requires 
consenting countries to treat domestic 
and foreign companies similarly. 
So far, national treatment appears in 
only a limited number of WTO texts: 
some members have agreed national 
treatment in some services sectors, and 
the provisions of the Agreements on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) and Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
imply national treatment. As indicated in 
the main text, the implications of offering 
national treatment will depend upon the 
characteristics of each market. 
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3.2.2 Scenario building on ‘offensive’ interests 
In the absence of any clear EU offer to assess, preparatory work on potential ‘gains’ 
needs to focus on the extent to which the ACP would benefit in practice from 
improved access to the EU market. Such analysis would underpin ACP demands 
during the negotiations. In particular, it is important to assess how far an extension to 
all ACP states of EBA access would significantly: 
♦ enlarge the range of agricultural products, in which the ACP have a supply 
capacity, that they could export to the EU; 
♦ pose a competitive threat for European producers. 
More speculatively, the ACP should prepare dossiers on areas in which the current 
rules of origin and SPS regulations have constrained exports. In the nature of the case, 
these are often very difficult to ‘prove’. The main effect of onerous rules of origin is 
to deter the initial investment that would have resulted in the export. Hence, there may 
be major adverse effects of onerous origin rules without any cases of goods being 
turned back at the European border (or having tariff surcharges imposed) as a result of 
non-compliance. Similarly, countries may be constrained from exporting agricultural 
products that they know will not meet SPS requirements. In these cases, there will be 
no ‘examples’ of goods condemned at the point of entry into Europe.  
For these reasons, the ACP states need to be able to build scenarios which show, 
plausibly, how a particular set of changes to current requirements could provide a 
boost to domestic investment and exports. This research will form the foundation for 
further, more specific analysis that leads to clear cut negotiating requests. 
One specific, helpful piece of research would be to assess the implications (for both 
the ACP and the EU) of applying Cotonou origin rules on cumulation to EBA 
products originating in ACP states. These rules are less onerous than those in the GSP 
which currently apply to EBA. Hence, if least-developed ACP states export to the EU 
under EBA they are required to abide by the GSP rules which make it difficult to 
incorporate inputs from non-least-developed ACP states. An improvement that needs 
to be assessed is to allow the less onerous Cotonou rules to apply to cumulation 
between ACP states but not with non-ACP least-developed states. 
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Section 4: Proposed Action Plan 
4.1  A timetable 
The key research priorities for post-2007 are set out in Table 1. This relates the data 
gathering and research to the timetable established by the ACP in their Guidelines. 
The table concentrates on the next nine months. Once this ‘foundation level’ research 
has been completed, the next more detailed studies will have become much clearer. 
Table 1. Research needs for negotiating the post-2007 agricultural trade regime 
Activity Timing Required information Process Timing 
Competition and fiscal implications of 
alternative EPA configurations in 
agriculture 
Data-gathering in 
member states plus 
desk research 
Oct.–Dec. 
2002 
Development of 
negotiating 
documents and 
positions 
Oct. 2002–
Mar. 2003 
Clear understanding of the agricultural 
trade provisions of the Cotonou 
Agreement by the relevant 
stakeholders 
Country stakeholder 
workshops 
Oct.–Dec. 
2002 
An assessment of the overlap between 
regional, multilateral and EU trade 
negotiations on agriculture 
Country studies Jan.–Mar. 
2003 
Negotiations at a 
technical level – 
phase 1 issues 
Mar.–June 
2003 
Impact assessment of EPAs on 
agricultural production and trade, and 
on food security 
Country and regional 
studies 
Feb.–May 
2003 
Technical level 
preparations for 
phase 2 
negotiations 
Sept.–Dec. 
2003 
Sensitivity analysis of alternative EPAs 
in terms of membership and coverage 
Regional studies May–June 
2003 
 
The first step is to collect the relevant customs and tariff data. In practice not all ACP 
trade negotiators are fully conversant with their current level of applied tariffs. 
Collecting this data may be time consuming – and can only effectively be done in 
each country. The situation on trade flow data is not quite so bad, but in-country, 
remedial data collection is needed. It is possible to obtain, easily enough, figures on 
each country’s trade with the EU from European sources. But, as explained in the 
preceding sections, this needs to be put in the context of each ACP state’s broader 
commerce. If a country favours the EU in its import policy which other trade partner 
will face trade diversion? If the country facing trade diversion is a regional partner 
this needs to be taken into account. If the country is another rich state (such as the 
USA) thought needs to be given to the dangers of retaliation of some kind. 
The second step is to ensure that as wide a cross-section of stakeholders as possible is 
aware of the possible implications of EPAs. Once the needed trade and tariff data has 
been collected it can be used not only to develop ACP negotiating positions but to 
give concrete, practical examples to stakeholders. It could form the basis, therefore, 
for a series of country and regional stakeholder workshops. 
With the basic building blocks of research in place, the scene will be set for a series of 
country studies. These will aim to set the potential implications of EPAs within the 
context of each country’s national and regional development strategies. This will help 
to identify in broad terms the type of EPA regime that makes most developmental 
sense. At the same time, it will begin to be possible to establish clear links between 
ACP objectives in the WTO and in their negotiations with the EU. 
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When this information is combined with the sensitivity analysis of alternative EPA 
memberships, it will be possible to identify the optimum EPA memberships. It will 
allow ACP states to negotiate among themselves to achieve a balance between the 
interests of potential EPA partners. And this is a pre-requisite for the start of EPA 
negotiations in Phase 2. 
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